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“[I]nterstate transactions are importantly different from international
transactions. Differences between state and foreign nation laws are greater
than differences between sister state laws. The Constitution applies only
in part to such conflicts. On the other hand, only international transactions
are influenced by international law and by foreign relations and foreign
commerce considerations.”1
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INTRODUCTION
Treating internal U.S. conflicts and international conflicts law the same,
without distinguishing between them, has always puzzled non-U.S. lawyers
and scholars.2 Europeans often do not understand how we can treat
transnational choice of law decisions as if they were between two domestic
states in light of the inherent differences between legal systems and
traditions. Nowhere today is this contrast between international legal
cultures and purely domestic matters more evident than in the realm of
family law and in particular issues relating to children, where religion,
culture, ethnicity, and morals help shape decisions. And nowhere is the
question of whether domestic and international conflicts should be treated
the same more pressing than in the current work of the American Law
Institute (“ALI”).
The ALI is currently in the process of preparing a new Restatement of
Conflicts (Third) and is faced with the issue of whether and how to address
cross-border family law cases.3 This decision is complicated by the fact that
the ALI is at the same time preparing a new Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law (Fourth). Many observers are uncertain about where private
international law aspects of private law matters such as family law should be
covered—in the Restatement of Conflicts (Third), the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law (Fourth), or both. One often thinks of the Restatement
of Foreign Relations as being addressed primarily toward issues of public
international law. For example, when faced with a choice of law question
involving a foreign custody order,4 few judges, and even fewer lawyers,
would know to consult the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third)5
about how to treat the foreign judgment. Indeed, there are almost no cases
relying on Section 485 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third).6
The dearth of references reflects in part the lack of familiarity by the U.S.
bar and judiciary with the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third) and
2. “On the whole, American courts and writers have not distinguished between international and
interstate conflicts for choice-of-law purposes. Indeed, some of the leading choice-of-law cases in this
country involved international conflicts, and in many of them that fact had no effect upon the ultimate
decision.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.04 reporters n. (AM. LAW INST.,
Preliminary Draft No. 2 2016) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2].
3. PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 § 1.0, cmt. e (relation of Restatement of Conflicts to Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law). The ALI is also currently working on a RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CHILDREN
AND THE LAW.
4. Although reference is made to custody orders, frequently disputes center on questions of access
or contact or what is also called visitation.
5. The ALI has already undertaken work on a RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW.
6. See Pefaur v. Pefaur, 617 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); compare with Cardenas
v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996, 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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the attendant need to incorporate different concerns when cross-border
elements are involved.
More importantly, the Restatement of Conflicts (Third) is confronted
with the overall question of how to incorporate international conflicts within
rules for interstate conflicts. This question of how different “foreign” as
opposed to “domestic” conflicts are treated pervades the entire project.7 The
current draft takes the position that international and interstate conflicts are
generally to be treated the same:
c. International conflicts. For purposes of conflict of laws, the interstate
and international contexts are broadly similar. The rules in this
Restatement are also usually applicable to cases with contacts to one or
more foreign nations. This is properly so since similar values and
considerations are involved in both interstate and international cases . . . .

There is of course some irony in the fact that the “founding” Conflicts
scholar, Justice Joseph Story, imported international public law concepts into
domestic application in the concept of territorialism, which ensures
sovereign control of all within the borders.
This essay looks at the Restatement of Conflicts (Third) within the
context of family law involving children. Although the realm of family law
involving children is vast,8 for purposes of this essay I have chosen to focus
primarily on examples based on child custody, visitation, and related issues,
and to exclude issues involving marriage and divorce.9 Within this category,
I will focus on three general aspects of the question whether interstate and
cross-border/international10 cases are the same and ought to be treated alike
in the area of family law related to children. First, much of cross-border
family law is covered by treaties and by regional instruments, including the
work of the United Nations,11 the Hague Conference on Private International

7. See generally Michaels, supra note 1 (arguing that international context must be considered in
the upcoming Restatement).
8. The newly begun ALI RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CHILDREN AND THE LAW evidences the
breadth of the subject.
9. For purposes of this Symposium, my topic was limited to conflict law issues concerning the
child. Professor Estin addressed marriage, divorce, and related issues.
10. I use the terms “cross-border” and “international” largely interchangeably, without necessarily
intending to suggest a public international context, which is often presumed to be the meaning of
“international” by some scholars.
11. Although the work of the United Nations to protect children’s rights cannot be overlooked, my
focus is not on public international law and human rights but on “private international law” which is not
the focus of most United Nations work in this area. On the other hand, the importance of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is integral to the earlier 1980 Hague Child Abduction
Convention and the later 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention.
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Law,12 and regionally by the European Union.13 Domestically, cross-border
family law is addressed by uniform state law14 and some federal law.15
Second, cross-border family law, especially those areas dealing with custody
and visitation, may have significant cultural, ethnic, and religious
dimensions that raise problems distinct from domestic cases; particularly in
connection with cases involving personal law and religious courts. Third, an
interrelated issue in the United States is the use of foreign law, the
importance of which the new Restatement of Conflicts has recognized with
draft provisions on proving foreign law.16 The proliferation of state foreign
law prohibitions and anti-Sharia laws threaten to remove from courts the
ability to resolve conflicts of law decisions in the cross-border context.17
This essay advocates a pragmatic approach to family law matters
involving children with international connections. These matters demand
special attention as the number of children crossing borders increases
exponentially under the continuous influence of globalization.18 Specifically,
I argue for addressing international conflicts involving children within the
Restatement of Conflicts (Third)—where most lawyers would expect to find
this analysis—but separately from purely domestic cases. International/
cross-border cases are different from purely interstate cases in conflict of
laws problems related to child custody, visitation, and measures of
protection.19 The international component introduces a variety of elements,
12. See infra text accompanying notes 32–53.
13. Council Regulation 2201/2003, Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, 2003 O.J. (L 338) (EC)
[hereinafter Brussels IIa Regulation]. The Brussels IIa Regulation (which entered into force on Mar. 1,
2005) applies to all Member States except Denmark and covers matrimonial matters and matters of
parental responsibility, including custody, access and child abduction. The European Commission
proposed new rules on June 30, 2016, COM (2016) 411 final 2016/0190 (CNS). The European Union
also has a regulation for succession. See Regulation (EC) 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of authentic
instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, 2012
O.J. (L 201) 107 (applicable as of Aug. 17, 2015).
14. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (Proposed Draft 1997)
[hereinafter UCCJEA]; UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (amended 2008) [hereinafter
UIFSA]; UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (Proposed Draft 1997,
amended 2013) [hereinafter UCCJEA 2013].
15. See, e.g., Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000);
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 9001–11 (2014).
16. PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 §§ 5.06–5.12 (2016).
17. One recent example is the new Florida statute for family law cases. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.0401 (West 2014) (this statute was created from SB 386, and was signed by the governor in 2014).
18. This cross-border movement is not limited to typical family movements but also results from
increased migration of refugees and families displaced by conflicts and war.
19. The phrase “measures of protection” is amplified in the 1996 Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental
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including different legal, cultural, religious, social, and moral values that are
not usually present in purely domestic cases, or at least not as prominent.
While it is possible for religious issues to arise in purely domestic cases
(particularly those involving marriage or divorce), in the international
context, the religious issue is often government sanctioned, with the personal
law being religious law and the family law courts being the religious courts,
such as in Jordan or Egypt. The impact is evident in dealing with questions
of jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement involving Islamic countries.
Even within the Islamic countries, the means and the extent of the
permeation of Sharia varies by country.20 Family law pertaining to the role
of women within the family structure, divorce, and child custody differs
significantly from that in the Western legal tradition and in the United
States.21
Certain aspects of situations concerning children touching on more than
one country argue in favor of special treatment for such international conflict
of law problems; these problems are distinct from wholly domestic cases.
Acknowledging these aspects will produce more consistent results that will
support harmonization in this critical area and allow children to move

Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, and Decisions on Matters Pertaining to the
Agenda of the Conference, art. 1, 35 I.L.M. 1391 (Oct. 19, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Child Protection
Convention]. Article 3 lists the topics such measures may cover:
a) the attribution, exercise, termination or restriction of parental responsibility, as well as its
delegation;
b) rights of custody, including rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in
particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence, as well as rights of access
including the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s
habitual residence;
c) guardianship, curatorship and analogous institutions;
d) the designation and functions of any person or body having charge of the child’s person or
property, representing or assisting the child;
e) the placement of the child in a foster family or in institutional care, or the provision of care
by kafala or an analogous institution;
f) the supervision by a public authority of the care of a child by any person having charge of
the child;
g) the administration, conservation or disposal of the child’s property.
20. Many countries have legal systems which have been influenced by, or based on, some form of
Sharia law, reflecting the different schools of Islamic legal thought. Similarly, the extent of the inclusion
of Sharia into the applicable family law rules varies as well, as does legislation on personal status. See
generally JAMAL NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS (2d ed. 1990). Examples of these
countries, not all of which are primarily Muslim, include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei,
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, the U.A.E. and Yemen.
21. Louise Ellen Teitz, Malta Process and Cross-Cultural Aspects in Family Disputes, in THE
CHILD’S INTERESTS IN CONFLICT: THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN SOCIETY, FAMILY, FAITH AND CULTURE
163, 163 (Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg ed., 2016).
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seamlessly from one country to another without raising significant issues of
private international law. In the bigger picture, United States decisions are
more likely to gain respect and recognition outside of the United States when
they reflect and embrace transnational norms rather than rely on purely
domestic and sometimes parochial viewpoints. In the end, we need to
evaluate what role the new Restatement of Conflicts (Third) can play in
helping continue the harmonization of private international law in crossborder family cases. We need to decide whether that role is best served by
integrating the cross-border cases with interstate/domestic cases or whether
a dual approach will be more successful, looking at the question in the
context of end-users: courts, governmental entities, practitioners, and
academics.
I. THE IMPACT OF HARMONIZATION ON CROSS-BORDER CHILD
DISPUTES
International family law as a discipline has experienced tremendous
growth in the last quarter century.22 As a result, it has become the focus for
increased unification and harmonization,23 as well as the subject of more
international and regional instruments.24 There is every reason to believe that
there will be increased unification in the near future.25 One cannot
22. There are also increasing numbers of books dealing with cross-border family law issues. See,
e.g., ANN LAQUER ESTIN, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW ABA DESK BOOK (2d ed. 2016); DAVID
HODSON, THE INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW PRACTICE (4th ed. 2015).
23. The intergovernmental organizations, such as The Hague Conference, UNIDROIT, and
UNCITRAL, have focused on unification (and indeed that is the stated purpose of the Hague Conference
statute: “work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law”). Their work has
also included harmonization in the form of model laws, legislative guides, principles, and other soft-law
instruments.
24. See infra notes 32–53 and supra note 13. In discussing “regional work,” one can also mention
the work of the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) and the Uniform Law Commission of Canada on a
joint project for cross-border recognition of civil protection orders. The ULC’s product is the Uniform
Recognition and Enforcement of Canadian Domestic-Violence Protection Orders Act, completed in 2015
and enacted in Delaware. See UNIFORM RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CANADIAN DOMESTICVIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS ACT (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.asp
x?title=Recognition%20and%20Enforcement%20of%20Canadian%20Domestic-Violence%20-Protecti
on%20Orders.
25. The Hague Conference is currently working on potential instruments (hard law or soft law) in
several areas involving children and family law. See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Report of the Experts’ Group Meeting on Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of
Agreements in Family Matters Involving Children (2015); see also current Hague Conference on Private
International Law projects, including the project on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil
Protections Orders (https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/protection-orders), the project
on Parentage and Surrogacy, specifically The Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of
Children,
Including
Issues
Arising
from
International
Surrogacy
Arrangements
(https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy), and the project on
Cohabitation Outside of Marriage (https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/cohabitation).
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underestimate the important role that uniform law, federal statutory, and
international and regional instruments currently play in what otherwise is a
private law area: family law. Today in the United States, uniform laws such
as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(“UCCJEA”),26 the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”),27 and
related federal statutes such as the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (“ICARA”),28 cover both domestic and cross-border cases. The
UCCJEA, approved in 1997, governs state court jurisdiction to make and
modify child custody determinations, including custody and visitation, but
not child support or adoption, which are covered in other federal and state
statutes. These uniform laws have been revised to incorporate international
components and provide a part of the means by which international treaties
such as the 2007 Hague Maintenance Convention29 and the 1996 Child
Protection Convention30 are or will be implemented domestically. Crossborder family law includes and is shaped by international treaties which
permeate decisions on child custody, support, adoption,31 parental child
abduction, and child protection. These conventions largely include their own
private international law rules, often by defining which country has
jurisdiction and what law applies.
A. The Work of The Hague Conference
The Hague Conference on Private International Law, an
intergovernmental entity based in The Netherlands, dating from 1893 and
having eighty-two members currently,32 serves the express purpose of
working “for the progressive unification of the rules of private international

26. See UCCJEA, supra note 14.
27. See UIFSA, supra note 14.
28. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 9001–11 (2014).
29. See Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family
Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, 47 I.L.M. (2008) [hereinafter 2007 Maintenance Convention].
30. See 1996 Child Protection Convention, supra note 19 (The United States has signed, but not
yet ratified the Child Protection Convention); Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, Status Table
34 https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=70 (listing the contracting states
to the Convention).
31. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the 17th Session, including the
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect on Intercountry Adoption, May 29,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention].
32. HCCH Members, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members (demonstrating that the membership currently consists of
eighty-one nations and the European Community, a regional economic integration organization).
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law.”33 The Hague Conference is well known for its seminal work in the area
of cross-border family law, especially in creating structures for international
legal cooperation to address international child abduction, child protection,
support/maintenance, and cross-border adoption. In addition, the Hague
Conference is currently working on possible instruments to facilitate crossborder recognition of voluntary agreements in international child disputes,
cross-border surrogacy and parentage issues, cohabitation outside marriage,
and cross-border recognition and enforcement of civil protection orders, all
of which are in various stages of development.34 The modern Hague family
law conventions establish an administrative unit for cooperation (the Central
Authority) in each contracting country and encourage amicable
resolutions—largely in the form of mediation.35 A country does not need to
be a member of the Hague Conference to become a contracting party to a
convention. For example, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention,36
discussed below, currently has ninety- seven contracting states.
The best known of the Hague Conference’s family law conventions is
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, which focuses on obtaining
the prompt return of a child wrongfully removed or retained in breach of
custody rights. The Convention provides a mechanism that ensures the
prompt return of a child up to the age of sixteen to his or her country of
“habitual residence” in the belief that that country is in the best position to
make determinations of custody and is able to determine what is in the best
interests of that child. The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention is often
referred to as a “venue” convention as it does not change the underlying
substantive custody law.
The 2007 Maintenance Convention, known in the United States as the
“Hague Child Support Convention,” establishes simple and inexpensive
procedures for the processing of international child support cases. While the
United States already has a comprehensive system to establish, recognize,
and enforce domestic and international child support obligations in place, the
Convention requires that all treaty partners have similar systems in place,
making it easier to enforce outgoing United States judgments overseas. In
addition to the Hague Child Support Convention, a separate Protocol
provides uniform international rules for the determination of the law
33. Statute of The Hague Conference on Private International Law, art. 1, July 15, 1955, 220
U.N.T.S. 122.
34. See supra note 25.
35. See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 7 c), Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention]; 1996 Child
Protection Convention, supra note 19, at art. 30; 2007 Maintenance Convention, supra note 29, at arts. 5,
6, 34.
36. 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 35.
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applicable to maintenance obligations. The United States chose not to join
the Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligation, a related
instrument, primarily because the differences between civil law systems and
common law systems were significant.
The 2007 Maintenance Convention entered into force for the United
States on January 1, 2017. The United States signed the Convention when it
was finished in 2007; work was undertaken on implementing legislation,
including the revisions to the existing uniform state law, UIFSA, to
accommodate the Convention. In 2010, the U.S. Senate approved ratification
of the 2007 Child Support Convention, but Congress had yet to enact
implementing legislation. There was some delay and the instrument of
ratification could not be deposited until all U.S. states and territories enacted
the amended version of UIFSA. In one highly publicized event, the Idaho
legislature threatened to block the amendments from enactment because of
fear that foreign law would control;37 a special session of the Idaho
Legislature was held to get approval and avoid the loss of federal funding for
child support in the state.
The 1996 Child Protection Convention38 is focused on providing clear
and uniform rules concerning jurisdiction, applicable law, and recognition
and enforcement in connection with “measures of protection” for children
up to the age of eighteen.39 The 1996 Convention also covers a broad range
of areas within “measures of protection”40 and is particularly useful in cases
of access, cross-border placements, and cross-border relocation. As with the
other contemporary Hague Conference Conventions, it provides for crossborder cooperation and communication, through the use of administrative
agencies. The basic chapter on choice of law rules, Chapter III, consists of
only eight articles. When measures of protection must be taken, the general
rule is that the country where the child is present applies its own law to decide
what measures can be taken.41
The 1996 Child Protection Convention, like some recent Hague

37. Steve Taggart, SB 1067: A Stand for Liberty or a Disaster for Idaho’s Children?, IDAHO POL.
WEEKLY (Apr. 19, 2015), http://idahopoliticsweekly.com/politics/252-sb-1067-a-stand-for-liberty-or-adisaster-for-idaho-s-children.
38. 1996 Child Protection Convention, supra note 19.
39. See generally HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE 1996 HAGUE CHILD PROTECTION CONVENTION (2014); Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Child Protection
Convention, Report by Paul Lagarde (1998); NIGEL LOWE & MICHAEL NICHOLLS, THE 1996 HAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (2012); Linda Silberman, The 1996 Hague Convention
on the Protection of Children: Should the United States Join?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 239 (2000).
40. See 1996 Child Protection Convention, supra note 19, at art. 3.
41. Id. at art. 15(1).
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Conference Conventions, has been signed by the United States but not
ratified, reflecting the realities of domestic implementation in an area—
family law—that has traditionally been the province of state law. The
UCCJEA was amended in 2013 to implement in part the Convention, but no
effort has been made to have any state adopt these amendments pending the
completion of some form of federal implementing statute as well. Based on
the experience of UIFSA and concern by some states with anything
“foreign,”42 the federal statute will need to have a “money hook” to motivate
state adoption of the UCCJEA amendments by the states. Interestingly, the
2013 UCCJEA amendments to incorporate the 1996 Child Protection
Convention are separated from the other provisions, setting up regimes for
Convention countries under new Article 4 and non-Convention countries,
reflecting the dual aspect of the UCCJEA.43 This approach serves as a model
and reinforces the need for a dual vision for the Restatement of Conflicts
(Third) in this area as well.
All of the Hague family law (as well as non-family law) Conventions
operate on a concept of “habitual residence”, an undefined term in Hague
Conventions (which is a source of consternation to many U.S.-trained
lawyers, judges, and academics) and a phrase that has come to permeate
regional instruments such as the EU’s Brussels Regulation and the Brussels
IIa Regulation.44 The term “habitual residence” becomes the defining
connecting factor for purposes of choice of law, jurisdiction, and recognition
and enforcement.45 While in the United States we have used the concept of
“domicile” for many purposes46 and in some statutes “home state,”47 the
phrase “habitual residence” cannot be ignored; particularly when dealing
with cross-border child issues, even outside of an applicable treaty. Indeed,
its importance as an integral part of unification of law cannot be
overestimated in the international context. The initial draft of the

42. See Taggart, supra note 37; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 7-1001–76 (West 2016); see also S.B. 1067,
63d Leg., Reg. Sess. Idaho 2015) (showing that the original title of the bill was “amends and adds to
existing law relating to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act” but it was engrossed-dead in March
of 2015).
43. For a thorough explanation of the 2013 Amendments, see Robert Spector, Preface to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM CHILD-CUSTODY
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (with 2013 Amendments Pertaining to International Proceedings)
1, 1–5 (2013); see generally Robert G. Spector, Memorandum: Accommodating the UCCJEA and the
1996 Hague Convention, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 615 (2011).
44. See Brussels IIa Regulation, supra note 13.
45. The Hague Conference has resisted efforts to define “habitual residence” in the conventions.
46. PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 § 2.02 reporters n. 1 (2016) (“This Chapter continues this approach
of giving dominance to the domicile concept.”).
47. See, e.g., UCCJEA, supra note 14.
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Restatement of Conflicts (Third)48 tended to collapse domicile and habitual
residence, indiscriminately substituting the latter for the former. The newest
draft is much more nuanced, returning to domicile but retaining habitual
residence for limited purposes,49 such as when required by statute or as a
fallback when domicile cannot be determined.50 The comments to the newest
draft stress that “[t]he difference between the two concepts rests on the
difference in proof.”51 The Restatement emphasizes the flexible nature of
habitual residence based on multiple factors—in the international context
these will need to include the approach of other jurisdictions, thereby
requiring a comparative law analysis.52 When compared to domicile,
habitual residence is more factual and objective, without focusing on
subjective evidence.53 Yet the tests and definitions for varying purposes, both
domestic and international, perhaps need further refinement as the
Restatement of Conflicts (Third) progresses.
B. The ALI’s Prior Work
The new Restatement of Conflicts (Third) needs to incorporate the
international character of current factual patterns and to create rules and
principles that are understandable by courts and judges in all fifty states in
the United States.54 This last issue highlights the overarching theme of this
essay: how to relate cross-border cases to purely domestic law on one hand
and international law on the other. Do issues of private international law
associated with cross-border family law disputes (child-centered) belong in
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.01–2.11 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary
Draft No. 1 2015).
49. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 § 2.02 reporters n. 5; § 2.04 cmts. a, b, c; reporters n. 1, 2
(2016).
50. This position creates some confusion, particularly for European lawyers who see the dominant
connecting factor as habitual residence.
51. PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 § 2.04 cmt. b (2016).
52. The Preliminary Draft makes reference to international child custody disputes and
acknowledges how important it is that treaties "must be interpreted to achieve uniformity among the
treaty-parties, and domestic interpretations of a term should not be imposed on international instruments."
PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 § 2.04 reporters n. 1 (2016). In connection with the 1980 Child Abduction
Convention, countries are encouraged to consult the database of cases from many countries interpreting
habitual residence. The database, INCADAT, can be found at HCCH, The International Child Abduction
Database (INCADAT), http://www.incadat.com.
53. PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 § 2.04 cmt. b (2016):
In evaluating domicile, courts have often looked to whether a person regards a place as the
person’s home, a subjective inquiry. The focus of habitual residence on a person’s myriad of
activities helps to ensure the habitual residence determination turns on objective proof of where
one has actually centered one’s life, rather than subjective evidence of emotional connection to
a place.
54. This delicate balancing is evident in the UCCJEA incorporation of the “home state” and a sixmonth test to equal habitual residence. UCCJEA, supra note 14, at art. 1, § 102(7).
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the Restatement of Conflicts (Third), or in the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law (Fourth)? We can begin by looking at what was in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law; in particular Sections 484,
485 and 486. Section 484 addresses Recognition of Foreign Divorce
Decrees;55 Section 485 addresses Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Child Custody Orders;56 and Section 486 addresses the Recognition of
Foreign Support Orders.57 Section 485 is relevant for our discussion. It
focuses on jurisdiction to modify custody orders and utilizes only habitual
residence (not domicile).

55. (1) Courts in the United States will recognize a divorce granted in the state in which both parties
to the marriage had their domicile or their habitual residence at the time of divorce, and valid and effective
under the law of that state.
(2) Courts in the United States may, but need not, recognize a divorce, valid and effective under the
law of the state where it was granted,
(a) if that state was, at the time of divorce, the state of domicile or habitual residence of
one party to the marriage; or
(b) if the divorce was granted by a court having jurisdiction over both parties, and if at
least one party appeared in person and the other party had notice of and opportunity to
participate in the proceeding.
(3) A court that would not recognize a divorce that is within Subsection 2(a) or 2(b) may
nevertheless recognize such a divorce if it would be recognized by the state where the parties were
domiciled or had their habitual residence at the time of the divorce.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 484 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
56. (1) A court in the United States will recognize an order of a foreign court awarding or modifying
an award of custody of a child, valid and effective in the state where it was issued, if, when the proceeding
was commenced,
(a) the issuing state was the habitual residence of the child;
(b) the child and at least one party to the custody proceeding had a significant connection
with that state; or
(c) the child was present in that state and emergency conditions required a custody order
for protection of the child;
provided that notice of the proceeding was given to each parent and to any other person having
physical custody of the child.
(2) Ordinarily, a court in the United States may modify a custody order entitled to recognition under
this section only if the rendering court no longer has jurisdiction to modify the order, or has declined to
exercise its jurisdiction to modify it.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 485 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
57. (1) A court in the United States will recognize and enforce an order of a foreign court for
support, valid and effective under the law of the state where it was issued, if the issuing state
(a) was the domicile or habitual residence of both parties to the marriage when the
obligation for support accrued;
(b) was the domicile or habitual residence of the support debtor at the time the order was
issued; or
(c) was the domicile or habitual residence of the support creditor, and the support debtor
appeared in the proceedings.
(2) A court in the United States may modify a support order entitled to recognition under Subsection
(1), at the initiative of either party, if the court has jurisdiction over the other party in accordance with §
421(2)(b), (c), or (g).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 486 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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§ 485 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Child Custody Orders
(1) A court in the United States will recognize an order of a foreign
court awarding or modifying an award of custody of a child, valid
and effective in the state where it was issued, if, when the proceeding
was commenced,
(a) the issuing state was the habitual residence of the child;
(b) the child and at least one party to the custody proceeding had
a significant connection with that state; or
(c) the child was present in that state and emergency conditions
required a custody order for protection of the child;
provided that notice of the proceeding was given to each parent and
to any other person having physical custody of the child.
(2) Ordinarily, a court in the United States may modify a custody
order entitled to recognition under this section only if the rendering
court no longer has jurisdiction to modify the order, or has declined
to exercise its jurisdiction to modify it.58

Very few cases exist in which courts have relied on Section 485 and
none has occurred in the last fifteen years.59 While this may suggest that
courts do not consider the cross-border case as one of “foreign relations”
law, it may also suggest that cases dealing with custody orders are being
handled primarily by state uniform law and in the future by treaty law, under
the 1996 Child Protection Convention, as implemented largely through state
uniform law. The lack of reliance on Section 485 lends support for the
inclusion of cross-border family law cases in the Restatement of Conflicts
(Third)—where lawyers and judges will likely look for guidance—rather
than in the Restatement of Foreign Relations (Fourth).
The provision in the Restatement of Conflicts (Second) considering
when a state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction, Section 79,60 uses
domicile (or presence) as the defining connection. The Restatement of
Conflicts (Third) acknowledges in comments to Section 2.06, which focuses
on the domicile of minors, that the rules for resolving child custody disputes
must yield to “more specific statutes and treaties in the case of conflict.”61
The matter is complicated, however, by the existence of an independent
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 485 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
59. See Pefaur v. Pefaur, 617 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So.
2d 996, 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
60. A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the custody, or to appoint a
guardian, of the person of a child or adult
(a) who is domiciled in the state, or
(b) who is present in the state, or
(c) who is neither domiciled nor present in the state, if the controversy is between two or
more persons who are personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
61. PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 § 2.06 cmt. g (2016).
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definition of habitual residence in Section 2.04 which may not be consistent
with domestic and foreign interpretation of habitual residence, particularly
in the context of treaty interpretation.
C. Merging Hague and ALI Approaches
The good news about the increased role that treaty law and uniform law
play in domestic family law is the increasing harmonization both among
domestic states in the U.S. and among foreign countries. But it also requires
U.S. law and the Restatements to accommodate traditions not native to our
common law. For example, in the United States, we generally recognize
continuing jurisdiction by the court that entered the order so that multiple
jurisdictions do not attempt to exercise jurisdiction and modify existing
orders.62 The 1996 Child Protection Convention, however, allows a shift in
jurisdiction when there is a change of habitual residence of the child. The
court with jurisdiction is usually the court of habitual residence (except in
cases involving emergency measures or refugee children); that court usually
uses its own law and other countries must recognize and enforce its measures
of protection.63 The 1996 Child Protection Convention contains provisions
allowing for the transfer of jurisdiction between courts (in effect
incorporating a concept like forum non conveniens),64 a lis pendens type
provision,65 and provisions for advance recognition of the judgment of one
country, the state of habitual residence, by another country especially in
connection with relocation.66
One of the crucial aspects of the increased role of treaty law is the
obligation to interpret provisions with consideration to their international
character67 and how other countries define crucial concepts such as habitual
residence, rights of custody, and measures of protection, a concept of
interpretation emphasized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Abbott v Abbott.68
The Hague Conference maintains an online database, INCADAT, containing
62. The UCCJEA gives priority in jurisdiction to the child’s home state, as defined in UCCJEA §
102, as the state where the child has lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately
prior to filing. UCCJEA, supra note 14, § 102. “Home state” under the UCCJEA may include a foreign
country. Id. §§ 102, 105. The UCCJEA also provides for continuing exclusive jurisdiction. A state that
takes jurisdiction over a child custody dispute retains jurisdiction so long as that state maintains a
significant connection with the disputants or until all disputants have moved away from that state. Id. §
202.
63. 1996 Child Protection Convention, supra note 19, at arts. 5, 15, 17, 23.
64. Id. at arts. 8–9.
65. Id. at art. 13 (effectively staying the action of one court while another has priority).
66. Id. at art. 24.
67. The current Preliminary Draft also supports this view but perhaps it needs to be included in the
blackletter and as a separate provision when dealing with cross-border cases. See supra note 48.
68. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
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more than 1,200 cases interpreting the Hague 1980 Abduction Convention;
many of which are relevant to the 1996 Child Protection Convention as well,
and including cases interpreting and construing “habitual residence,” thereby
encouraging consistent interpretation by the ninety-seven countries that are
currently states parties to the 1980 Convention.69
In cases with cross-border elements, courts often consider habitual
residence. Placing habitual residence more in the context of cross-border
cases may assist inexperienced courts and practitioners in interpreting United
States rules in relation to European instruments and regulations; in particular
the Brussels IIa Regulation. On the other hand, federal domestic law, such
as the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”), and uniform state law
use “home state” instead of habitual residence. One example is the definition
in the UCCJEA § 102(7):
“‘Home State’ means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a
person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately
before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a
child of less than six months of age, the term means the State in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.”70

This term (“home state”) is used in UIFSA, and as mentioned in the
UCCJEA, although that approach is replaced in the UCCJEA amendments
of 2013 that would implement the 1996 Child Protection Convention; in that
case, habitual residence appears as well.
For the new Restatement of Conflicts (Third), the crucial question is
how, and if, to treat international cases and where to draw the line between
domestic cases and cross-border; and where to divide the new work on
Restatements—among the Conflicts (Third), Foreign Relations Law
(Fourth), and the Restatement of the Law, Children and the Law. This
question is not merely philosophical, but also practical, and it holds
significant implications given the increased permeation of domestic law by
international treaties in cross-border cases; this infiltration has led to
significant divergence between cases involving Texas and Rhode Island and
cases involving Rhode Island and Morocco, or Rhode Island and Japan.

69. The Hague Conference’s database is available at HCCH, The International Child Abduction
Database (INCADAT), http://www.incadat.com/. The newest country to accede to the 1980 Convention
is Jamaica where the Convention will enter into force on 1 May 2017. See infra at note 74.
70. UCCJEA, supra note 14, at art. 1, § 102(7).
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II. THE CULTURAL, ETHNIC, AND RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF
CROSS-BORDER CHILD DISPUTES
Cross-border family law dealing with custody, visitation, and related
matters raises the issue of significant cultural, ethnic, and religious
variations, particularly when international cases involve personal status law
and religious courts. The differences in legal systems are qualitatively
different than state-by-state domestic variations, even when comparing with
domestic cases that involve religious differences.71 There is typically no
shared framework for jurisdiction as well as different concepts of genderbased roles of custody and guardianship that are State-sanctioned. In fact,
the courts using orders/measures of protection will frequently be religious
courts in many countries, rather than civil courts.
A. Islamic and Religious Law and the Malta Process
A key example of the issues present in cross-border cases is the situation
involving Islamic countries, specifically the implications when states must
address a child custody or visitation matter where the child’s habitual
residence may be in an Islamic country, or where one of the parents is
habitually resident in an Islamic country. Aside from issues of anti-Sharia
law, discussed later in this essay,72 the impact on conflict of laws
determinations should not be underestimated. These differences between
countries and their family law, especially when there is personal law and
religious courts, illustrate a lack of shared values that is uncommon in purely
domestic law cases. The difficulty in harmonizing rules for private
international law in this area, especially where there is personal law, is one
that the Restatement must confront—even within domestic interstate cases.
Recent work of the Hague Conference, as the premiere organization
concerned with unification of private international law (conflict of laws),
offers an example of some of these issues and various attempts to solve them.
The 1996 Child Protection Convention, more than the 1980 Child Abduction
Convention, openly embraces cultural and religious differences in the rules
for jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement. The most obvious example
is the inclusion of “kafala,” the Islamic functional equivalent to adoption, as
a measure of protection in Article 33 on cooperation in cross-border
placements.73 The institution of “kafala,” which was included in the 1996
Child Protection Convention at the urging of Morocco, varies from adoption

71. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Foreign and Religious Family Law: Comity, Contract, and
the Constitution, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1029 (2014).
72. See infra at Part IV.
73. 1996 Child Protection Convention, supra note 19, at art. 33.
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in that it does not change parental rights directly. Another example is found
in Article 10 which concerns a contracting state’s jurisdiction to include
claims of parental responsibility in connection with divorce proceedings.
Article 10 is drafted so that countries with religious courts for divorce may
simply exclude its application; the Article is largely a recognition of different
legal systems with different characteristics. Since the 1996 Child Protection
Convention gives no role to nationality or religion, instead placing an
emphasis on the habitual residence of the child which it uses as the
jurisdictional basis, that concept has created difficulties for some countries
where family law is part of religious personal law. Thus far, Morocco, which
has religious courts, is the only country in the Islamic world that is signatory
to both the 1980 Child Abduction Convention and the 1996 Child Protection
Convention. Iraq and Pakistan have acceded to the 1980 Child Abduction
Convention.74 Israel, which also includes religious courts in its faith-based
personal law system, joined the 1980 Convention in 1991 and is currently
preparing to join the 1996 Convention.
The work of the Hague Conference in connection with attempting to
accommodate the Islamic countries is a broader example of the challenges
of harmonization, a problem that the Restatement of Conflicts (Third) must
confront. At the Hague Conference, the Malta Process,75 a major project that
began in 2004, specifically focuses on finding a means for contracting states
to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention (and the 1996 Child
Protection Convention) and non-contracting states that have legal systems
influenced by, or based on Sharia to work together. The Malta Process seeks
to find solutions to cross-border family law disputes in situations where the
relevant international legal structure is not applicable, by encouraging
dialogue and improving cooperation between contracting states to the 1980
and 1996 Conventions and states with legal systems that are influenced by
or based upon Sharia. Now more than a decade old, the Malta Process is
based on shared concerns for the best interest of the child and encouraging
mutual respect for different legal systems. The focus of the Malta Process is
on the protection of children and the child’s right to continuing contact with
parents living in different countries. Four conferences of high-level experts,
many from the judiciary, from contracting and non-contracting states worked
on finding common responses to shared problems. One of the more
successful aspects of the Malta meetings was the use of common crossborder family law problems as hypothetical cases—a process whereby the
74. Iraq became a Contracting State to the 1980 Convention in 2014. Pakistan became a
Contracting State in December of 2016 and the Convention became effective on 1 March 2017
75. See generally Louise Ellen Teitz, Malta Process and Cross-Cultural Aspects in Family
Disputes, in THE CHILD’S INTERESTS IN CONFLICT 163 (Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg ed., 2016).
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participants, working through similar case studies, learned and shared their
approaches. This introduced participants to a greater understanding of the
importance of both common principles and agreed solutions. All four
conferences focused on identifying common legal principles, such as
concepts of jurisdiction, and shared values, such as the child having contact
with both parents and the best interest of the child, which could lead to basic
tools for better cooperation. Ultimately, the Malta Process attempts to bridge
the gap created by a lack of shared jurisdictional bases through soft law tools
and alternative dispute resolution—mediation. The Malta Process illustrates
that the underlying issue of accommodating different cultural and religious
values is not just an issue in United States and not one that can simply fall
under “public policy” short of a violation of “fundamental principles of
human rights.”76
B. Morals and Mores and Cross-Border Surrogacy
A second example in cross-border family law that illustrates the depth
of variations in underlying legal, cultural, and religious values is in the area
of parentage and surrogacy.77 The problems raised by cross-border surrogacy
again differ from those in domestic interstate cases because they include
components such as citizenship and sovereignty. If one is from Rhode Island
or Texas, one is still a U.S. citizen, but if one is a child of a citizen of India
as opposed to a U.S. citizen, the decision is different. Even more basic is the
question of who is the parent of a child born from a cross-border surrogacy
and resulting from other artificial reproductive technologies. There are
multiple alternatives, and what role genetic material plays in connection with
birth certificates or registries continues to raise variations of private
international law that have plagued courts in many countries, as well as
regional courts such as the European Court of Human Rights.78 The problems
are detailed in many of the documents produced by the Hague Conference,
76. See, e.g., 1980 Child Abduction Convention, at art. 20; UCCJEA 2013, supra note 14, § 310
(a)(1)(E) (providing an exception for recognition and enforcement of a foreign custody order where “the
order sought to be enforced is from a nonconvention country whose child custody law violates
fundamental principles of human rights”).
77. For a thorough discussion of the private international law issues involved in cross-border
surrogacy arrangements, the possibility of a global instrument, and the work of the Hague Conference,
see the work of the former Secretary General of the Hague Conference, Hans van Loon, Address at Gent
University at the Private International Law Session: The Global Horizon of Private International Law
(May 9, 2016) [hereinafter Hans van Loon Address].
78. See Labassee v. France, App. No. 65941/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014); Mennesson v. France, App.
No. 65192/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014). For a discussion of the cases, see Liesbet Pluym, Mennesson v.
France and Labassee v. France: Surrogate motherhood across borders, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Jul.
16, 2014), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/16/mennesson-v-france-and-labassee-v-france-surro
gate-motherhood-across-borders/.
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dating back to at least 2007 but especially since 2012 as it has tried to move
forward to unify or harmonize this area of private international law and
perhaps produce a binding instrument.79 Questionnaires to member countries
and to key stakeholders reflect different values and different approaches to
filiation.80 Indeed, the lack of shared values on these difficult issues that raise
moral, religious, and cultural considerations has also made it difficult for the
Hague Conference to find consensus among its member states to support a
binding instrument.81
There is no binding instrument equivalent to the interstate Full Faith
and Credit applicable to domestic cases to protect children when they cross
international borders. There are numerous cases of children born from a
foreign surrogacy, such as in India, not being able to return with the
“commissioning” or intended parents, especially if there is no genetic link.
As such, questions of status and the consequences of that determination—
exacerbated by varying social, moral, and cultural values—become major
issues in the international context, issues that the new Restatement (Third)
must be equipped to address and provide assistance with for judges and
practitioners.
Cross-border family law issues are influenced by rapidly changing
social mores, from surrogacy to same sex marriage.82 Old presumptions,
such as that favoring marriage, may not be relevant. And what we consider
“marriage” changes, as we have seen in a recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision83 Public policy in determinations of conflict of laws in the
international context may need to be resorted to more frequently in the
international situation than in the purely domestic case. “[I]n the field of the
79. The Report of the Experts’ Group on Parentage/Surrogacy in February 2016 made the following
conclusion and recommendation to the Council on General Affairs and Policy for its March 2016 meeting:
16. The Group determined that, owing to the complexity of the subject and the diversity of
approaches by States to these matters, definitive conclusions could not be reached at the
meeting as to the feasibility of a possible work product in this area and its type or scope. The
Group was of the view that work should continue and at this stage consideration of the
feasibility should focus primarily on recognition. The Group therefore recommends to Council
that the Group’s mandate be continued . . .
See General Affairs and Policy, Report of the February 2016 Meeting of the Experts’ Group on
Parentage/Surrogacy, Prelim.. Doc. No. 3 (Feb. 2016), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/f92c95b5-4364-4461bb04-2382e3c0d50d.pdf.
80. Responses to these questionnaires are available online at the web page of The
Parentage/Surrogacy Project of the Hague Conference, https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislativeprojects/parentage-surrogacy.
81. The Hague Conference, in adding projects to its Agenda and prioritizing work, operates by
consensus at the Council on General Affairs and Policy.
82. For an interesting study of the changing family law in Europe, see generally FAMILY LAW AND
CULTURE IN EUROPE: DEVELOPMENTS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (Katharina Boele-Woelki et
al. eds., 2014).
83. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
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law of persons and families, private international law should not block but
facilitate and support cross-border relationships, . . . and help avoid limping
legal relationships, while recognizing that the impact of culture and
traditions is generally more significant in this area than in the economic
sphere.”84 Any conflict of law rules will need to respond to changing values
but those for international cases may need to be more nimble.
III. FOREIGN LAW IN U.S. COURTS
The last challenge facing the Restatement (Third) when dealing with
cross-border cases involving children is that of how U.S. state law
accommodates “foreign law” and the use of public policy.
The UCCJEA has treated foreign orders as those of a “sister state”
generally. Although U.S. state cases in both family and nonfamily law areas
have involved the role of religious law, including Judaism and Sharia, the
question of foreign law has been getting intense scrutiny in state capitals and
legislatures for the last decade, particularly in the form of laws banning
courts from applying foreign law and international law. In the last eight
years, these laws have gained momentum specifically in connection with
anti-Islamic sentiment. These bans have not been limited to the family law
area but certainly threaten to disrupt cross-border recognition and
enforcement of child custody orders, visitation orders, and other measures of
protection for children. Studies have suggested that more than twenty states
have either proposed or adopted bills or state constitutional amendments to
prevent state courts from using international law in court decisions.85 Some
scholars and legislators question why public policy is not sufficient
protection without additional state bans to avoid the application of foreign
law that “shocks the conscience.” The recent cases concerning these foreign
law and Sharia bans have primarily challenged their constitutionality. So far
there have not been cases using the ban to stop the application of foreign law.
One recent example of a state law ban of foreign law as applied to

84. Hans van Loon Address, supra note 77, at 45.
85. In a study completed in October 2015, the National Conference of State Legislatures found that
twenty states had introduced legislation as of the year 2015 to restrict the use of foreign law in state courts,
and Mississippi had enacted legislation on the topic in 2015. At that time, eight states had laws prohibiting
the use of foreign laws in state courts. 2015 Foreign Law Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-legislation
-regarding-the-application-of-foreign-law-in-state-courts.aspx.
An earlier 2013 study focused on anti-Sharia statutes and found that thirty-two states had “introduced
and debated” these types of bills. See FAIZA PATEL, AMOS TOH & MATTHEW DUSS, CENTER FOR JUSTICE
and the CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AND
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS (May 16, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/foreign-law-banslegal-uncertainties-and-practical-problems.
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family law is a Florida statute as originally proposed which would have
forbidden Florida family courts from applying any foreign laws, legal codes
or doctrines in divorce, child custody or child support cases. This would have
prevented courts from recognizing any foreign orders in family court; a
major difficulty which is larger than Sharia, and one that would seem
significant in cross-border cases of divorce, custody, visitation,
guardianship, and other measures of protection for children in a state that has
many transplants, especially from areas of Latin America. The final version
of the Florida statute was weakened and now simply invokes public policy
as a means to avoid giving comity to a foreign law if it “contravenes the
strong public policy of this state or [if the law is] unjust or unreasonable.”86
The Florida statute highlights the issue that the Restatement of Conflicts
(Third) must address, especially as we continue to have more cases that
include conventions and as the state uniform laws adapt to cross-border
cases. Certainly when or if the United States ratifies the 1996 Child
Protection Convention, courts will have to address and recognize foreign
measures of protection from treaty partners and non-contracting countries.
CONCLUSION
Issues of family law, especially those dealing with children, will
increasingly raise international issues and inject foreign elements into an
area traditionally considered purely “local” and governed by state law.
Recognition of the importance of the international component is also shared
by our colleagues abroad. Rt. Honorable Lady Justice Jill Black, the Head of
International Family Justice for England and Wales, captures what we are
struggling to incorporate into the Restatement: “These days, no family law
practitioner or judge can afford to approach family law problems from a
purely domestic perspective. So many cases involve international issues of
some kind . . . . It is all too easy to fall into some sort of trap without even
realizing it has happened.”87
This area magnifies the overarching question facing the Restatement of
Conflicts (Third) of how and where to address the international elements and
cases. I have emphasized the need to acknowledge the differences in wholly
domestic and cross-border cases and that by embracing that difference, we
will produce more consistent results that will support harmonization in this
critical area, helping to allow children to move seamlessly from one country
to another without raising significant issues of private international law. We
86.
87.

See supra note 17.
Jill Black, Foreword to International Issues, in HENRY SETRIGHT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW: THE 1996 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND
BRUSSELS IIA (2015).
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must continue to evaluate what role the new Restatement (Third) can play in
harmonizing private international law of in family law by addressing the
differences from domestic law and finding a robust shared solution.

